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THE SHORT-RUN BEHAVIOR OF 
FORWARD-LOOKING FIRMS 
Abstract 
A theory of short-run competitive firm behavior allowing for nonmyopic risk aversion, 
randomness in input and output prices, as well as forward trading and storage of final good and 
material input is introduced. If the finn is a forward-looking risk-averse expected-utility 
maximizer, separation of production and storage from hedging decisions is obtained. Production 
and storage are shown to depend only upon forward and cash prices and to be independent of the 
agent's degree of risk aversion and the distribution of random prices. Comparative statics are 
derived regarding production, purchases, and sales. The hypotheses advanced are tested 
empirically with monthly data pertaining to the U.S. soybean-processing industry. The results 
support the model and suggest that in stationary equilibrium futures prices of the soybean complex 
have had little influence on crushings or production, but they have been important determinants of 
inventory levels. Both theoretical and empirical results indicate that short-run firm behavior is 
more complex than is generally assumed in the literature. They also suggest long-term firm 
behavior can be better understood by studying its short-term behavior rather than using the 
medium- to long-run models that are currently available. 
THE SHORT-RUN BEHAVIOR OF FORWARD-LOOKING FIRMS 
The objective function used in the theory of the firm typically contains output price times 
output quantity and a quantity-dependent cost function. Implicit are the assumptions that the firm 
simultaneously sells output and buys inputs at known prices. In many firms, however, much of 
the managerial effort is targeted toward buying inputs when their prices are lowest, selling output 
when its price is highest, using input and output storage to take advantage of price movements, and 
employing forward and/or futures markets to hedge some of the risks associated with production 
and storage. These activities are particularly important in commodity-oriented firms, such as those 
involved in producing and processing food and natural resources. 
In the medium and long terms, the observed short-term differences between production and 
output sales and between input purchases and usage are averaged out and seem trivial. The 
medium- and long-term behavior of the firm, however, may reflect the cumulative impact of short-
term decisions. In this instance, a full understanding of medium- and long-term behavior will 
depend on how managers respond to short-term incentives. 
Figures I and 2 illustrate these assertions with data from the U.S. soybean-processing 
industry. Figure I depicts the annual quantities of soybeans purchased and processed, and the 
annual sales (in soybean units) of soybean oil and meal for the years 1967/66 through 1986/85.1 It 
can be seen that annual crushings, purchases, and sales are almost indistinguishable. The major 
departures from the common pattern are those of oil sales in the years 1977n6, 1980n9, and 
1984/83. It is erroneous, however, to infer from Figure 1 that processors manage crushings, 
purchases, and sales as a single undifferentiated entity. Figure 2 displays the monthly quantities 
purchased, processed, and sold for two typical years (1980:8 through 1982:8). The sharp contrast 
between Figures 1 and 2 shows that behavioral rules derived from monthly data will be 
substantially different from those found with annual data. Behavioral rules estimated from 
1Soybean processors crush raw soybeans to produce oil and meal in fixed proportions. 
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monthly data should provide a better understanding of actual behavior than rules obtaiiled from 
annual data, because real-world decisions are made at intervals much shorter than one year. 
In this paper, we develop and test a theory of short-run competitive fum behavior under 
risk aversion in the presence of forward markets. One innovation in this model is that we allow the 
firm to be forward-looking or nonmyopic, that is, we assume that the fum's planning horizon 
exceeds the fum's decision horizon.2 The study also shows how short-term parameters can be 
used to derive meaningful long-term response parameters. 
Nearly all of the literature on the theory of the competitive firm under uncertainty is based 
on myopic or static models. The standard assumption is that the fum's decision and planning 
horizons are identical and equal to "one period" (Robert Merton 1982, p. 656), i.e., the fum's 
objective is to maximize the expected utility of wealth at the end of the current period, without 
concern about future periods. The main results from this theory are that the risk-averse fum will 
produce at a point such that production under price uncertainty is less than under certainty (Agnar 
Sandrno 1971) and that a marginal increase in price uncertainty reduces production if the fum's 
risk attitude is either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion (DARA or CARA, respectively) 
(Y asunori Ishii 1977). 
The framework set up by Agnar Sandrno led to a formal analysis of the behavior of the firm 
in the presence of forward and futures markets for the final good. Jean-Pierre Danthine ( 1978), 
Duncan Holthausen (1979), and Gershon Feder et al. (1980) further refined Agnar Sandmo's 
model by introducing a forward market for the final product They proved that, in the presence of 
a forward market, the competitive fmn facing price uncertainty (and nonstochastic production) will 
produce as if the price were certain and equal to the forward price. This result is usually referred to 
as the separation property. When there is basis risk, that is, the case of futures markets, Carl 
Battin (1983) and Jacob Paroush and Avner Wolf (1989) showed that (i) the fum will produce less 
2Roben Merton (1982, p. 656) defines decision horizon as "the length of time between which the investor 
makes successive decisions, and it is the minimum time between which he would take any action," and planning 
horizon as "the maximum length of time for which the investor gives any weight in his utility function." 
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than in the absence of basis risk and that (ii) the separation property generally does not hold. 
Recently, however, Harvey Lapan eta!. (1991) demonstrated that separation occurs even in the 
presence of basis risk if the utility function is CARA and the relationship between futures and cash 
prices satisfies some commonly assumed regularity conditions. 
Edward Zabel ( 1971) pioneered the study of forward-looking behavior under risk aversion, 
allowing also for inventories of final good. Zabel proposed a CARA intertemporal utility function 
to characterize the preferences of the competitive firm. His line of research was not pursued until 
recently, when John Hey (1987) built a dynamic model of the competitive firm with a forward 
market for final good. In that theoretical paper, John Hey assumed a risk-averse firm with an 
additive intertemporal utility function. The firm was allowed to hold inventories of final good and 
also to trade in a forward market for final good. With this setting, Hey proved that the firm 
separated production from hedging and showed that it produced as if the cash price were known 
and equal to the forward price. In addition to postulating additive utility, a characteristic of Hey's 
paper is that the results depend crucially upon the production and hedging and sales decisions 
occurring sequentially. In his model, the firm chooses optimal production and hedging at one 
decision date and optimal sales at the next decision date. For the short-run analysis considered in 
this study, a more realistic scenario would involve simultaneous rather than sequential decision 
making. 
A different approach to forward-looking behavior in the presence of futures markets was 
undertaken by Ronald Anderson and Jean-Pierre Danthine (1983). They allowed the firm to revise 
the futures position within the cash market holding period and found that there is separation 
between cash and futures decisions. However, they assumed a single production cycle, which 
seems overly restrictive to model the behavior of some types of firms (for example, commodity 
processors). 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we lay out the theoretical model. We then 
test some of the theoretical results using data from the U.S. soybean-processing industry, and 
discuss our fmdings in Sections II and Ill. In Section TV, we summarize the major conclusions. 
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I. The Theoretical Model 
Consider a competitive finn characterized by a twice continuously differentiable von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, utility being strictly increasing and concave in its argument 
terminal wealth (U(WT), U' > 0, U" < 0). Terminal wealth is defined as 
where W, is monetary wealth at the end of decision date t, 1t, is the cash flow at time t, and r, 
equals one plus the one-period interest rate prevailing at t Interest rates can change from period to 
period, but they are assumed to be nonstochastic. At each trading date t, the fum can borrow and 
lend unlimited amounts of money for one period at the prevailing interest rate. The time elapsed 
between successive decision dates represents the fum's decision horizon. The furthest in the 
future that the finn cares about is date T, hence the time comprised between dates t and Tis the 
firm's planning horizon at date t 
It is further assumed that the firm's short-run production function is represented by the 
Leontief function 
(!.2) Q, = min[O:/<l>, q(·)], <l> > 0 
where Q, denotes production of final good at date t, 0: is material input use at date t, <l> is a fixed 
input-output coefficient, and q(·) is a strictly increasing and concave production function for 
nonmaterial inputs such that q(O) = 0. According to (!.2), adding <l> units of material input 
increases production by one unit over the range in which the set of variable nonmaterial inputs does 
not constrain production. Walter E. Die wert ( 1971) has shown that the cost function dual to the 
production function (1.2) is 
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(1.3) C, =<I> s, Q,- c(Q,;·) 
where C, is variable cost at date t. s, is material input price at date t, and c(Q,;·) represents a strictly 
increasing and convex variable nonmaterial cost function. 
For our purposes, the most important property of the Leontief function (1.2) is that there is 
no substitution between material and nonmaterial inputs. The absence of substitution between 
material and nonmaterial inputs allows us to introduce randomness in material input prices without 
having to face the extreme complications that would arise otherwise (Raveendra Batra and Arnan 
Ullah 1974, Richard Hartman 1975, Marion Stewart 1978, Stylianos Perrakis 1980, Brian Wright 
1984). This property also allows us to address the lack of input substitutability that exists in the 
short run. 
Relaxation of the standard nonstorage constraint is one of the main contributions of our 
analysis. Hence, we make explicit allowance for storage of both output and material input The 
presence of storage means that output sales and material input purchases will generally be different 
from the amount produced and the material input employed in the production process, respectively. 
We also allow for the presence offorward markets for both output and material input. This is the 
most general setting of our model; in situations where one or both forward markets are not 
available, the more general scenario can be adjusted by omitting the relevant variables from the 
objective function. 
The assumption of forward markets as opposed to either futures markets or both forward 
and futures markets greatly simplifies the presentation. The major theoretical result used in the 
empirical section (i.e., the separation property) can also be derived from models that assume the 
existence of either only futures or both forward and futures markets, by applying the techniques 
used by Harvey Lapan eta!. (1991), Jacob Paroush and Avner Wolf (1989), and Frances 
Antonovitz and Ray Nelson (1988). Harvey Lapan eta!. (1991) showed that, when some 
regularity conditions are imposed on the utility function and on the relationship between futures 
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and cash prices, the separation property holds in the presence of futures instead of forward 
markets. Jacob Paroush and Avner Wolf (1989), and Antonovitz and Nelson (1988) demonstrated 
that the separation property holds in the presence of both forward and futures markets. 
The studies mentioned in the previous paragraph omit the marking-to-market that takes 
place in futures as opposed to forward markets. Marking-to-market has been analyzed in the 
context of a single production cycle by Ronald Anderson and Jean-Pierre Danthine (1983). Under 
the same assumptions that we make about financing, these authors show that marking to market 
affects only the futures position and not the physical position. Extending our model to include 
marking-to-market as in Anderson and Dan thine is straightforward, albeit tedious. This extension 
would involve modifying expressions (1.4) and (1.6) below, by including equations to reflect 
marking-to-market, and then obtaining first-order-conditions for the decision dates in which no 
physical decisions are taken. Our paper's key results, however, would remain unchanged because 
of the separation property. 
The particularforrn of the ftrm's cash flow at any date t = 0, 1 ,. .. , T-1 is 
where: p1 = cash price of ftnal good at date t 
P1 = sales of final good at date t 
s1 = cash price of material input at date t 
st = purchases of material input at date t 
i(· ), i5 (-) = strictly increasing and convex variable inventory cost functions of ftnal good 
and material input, respectively 
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I,= beginning inventory of final good at date t, I, = ~- 1 -P,_1 + Q,_1 
r: =beginning inventory of material input at date t, r: = r:.1 + s,_1 - ~-1 
f,_1_, =forward price for delivery of final good at t, prevailing at t-1 
F,_1 = net short position for delivery of final good at t, open at t-1 
~'t+l =forward price for delivery of material input at t, prevailing at t-1 
F;_1 =net short position for delivery of material input at t, open at t-1 
At any date t there are only two positions that can be traded in the forward market: one for delivery 
of the good at date t+ I, and the other for immediate delivery (i.e., delivery at t).3 The cash flow 
due to the opening of the forward contract lags one period the actual decision to open the contract 
because forward trading does not involve cash flows until positions are closed. Forward prices 
prevailing at t for immediate delivery are identical to the corresponding current cash prices of 
output (p,) and material input (s,). Forward prices at t for delivery at the following date t+ I (ft,t+1 
and ~t+l), however, will be generally different from the respective current cash prices p, and s,. 
At any decision date t, the firm selects the levels of purchases and use of material input (S, 
and~), production (Q, = ci> ~),sales of final good (P,), and hedging (F, and~) that maximize 
expected utility, given available information. The optimal decision vector at the current date t = 0 
(d0* = (P0*, ~·, S0 *, F0 *, Fa*)) is obtained by solving the following set of recursive equations 
3we do not require that the good be actually delivered, but we still use the tenn delivery for clarity of 
exposition. Forward commitments may be canceled either by delivering the good or by undertaking an opposite 
trnnsaction in the forward market 
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where d, = (P,, Q;, s,. F,, F,) is the decision vector at date t, D, is the feasible decision set at date 
t, E,O denotes the expectation operator based on information available at t, P, = (p0, s0, f0•1, 
fcu , ... , p,. s,, ft,t+l' ~t+l) is a vector containing past and current prices, and terminal wealth and 
cash flows are given by (1.1) and (1.4), respectively. The solution to the problem summarized by 
expressions ( 1.5) and ( 1.6) can be obtained by recursively solving the Lagrangian functions 
+ 11, (1,- P,) + 11: 0: + S,- ~). t = 0, 1, ... , T-1 
where 11, and 11: are the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to inventories of final good and 
material input, respective] y. 
The first order necessary conditions (FOCs) corresponding to the terminal date Tare 
( 1.9) 
( 1.1 0) df-r = - ("- + c'/<f>) MT' :::; 0, ~ 2: 0, n' df-r = 0 a~ -, ~ ~a~ 
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where MT' represents U' evaluated at the optimum. The rationale for Kuhn-Tucker condition 
(1.10) is that the amount processed cannot be negative (i.e., production reversal is precluded). 
Neither (1.9) nor (1.11) are Kuhn-Tucker conditions because the firm is allowed to buy final good 
and sell material input. The fust term of the derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to 
sales is positive, hence the Lagrangian multiplier (Th) is also positive to satisfy (1.9). But if TlT > 
0, then of-r/dTh =IT- PT must equal zero to avoid violating the Kuhn-Tucker condition (1.12). By 
the same reasoning, Tl~ > 0 and of-r/i1Tl~ = ~ + ST- o;. = 0. Finally, of-r/oo;. > 0 because MT' > 0 
and c' > 0, which requires Q~ = 0 in order to satisfy (1.1 0). Therefore, the optimal decision vector 
at the terminal date T consisTs of liquidating inventories (PT* =IT and ST* =-~)and processing no 
material input CO:.*= 0). Consequently, the optimal cash flow reduces to 1tT• = PT IT, and the 
value function is 
For dates prior to the terminal date (t = 0, ... , T-1), the FOCs are (see Appendix A): 
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where Mt' = Et(Mt+l') evaluated at the optimum corresponding to date t (note that Mt' > 0). The 
solution to FOCs (1.15) through (1.21) is a unique absolute constrained maximum because the 
objective function is strictly concave, and the constraint set is convex.4 These FOCs can be further 
manipulated to yield separation between "physical" decisions (i.e., purchases, production, and 
sales) and hedging. This assertion is readily shown by substituting (1.18) into (1.15) and (1.16), 
and ( 1.19) into ( 1.17), and rearranging, which yields the set of expressions (1.22) through ( 1.24) 
as an alternative to (1.15) through (1.17): 
(1.22) ft.t+l- rt [pt- i'(l1 - Pt)] = 11/(rt+l ... rT.J Mt') 
(1.23) ft,t+l- rt [<I> st- c'(Q;/<l>)]::; 0, ~ ~ 0, ~ {ft,t+l - rt [<I> st- c'(Q;/<I>)]} = 0 
Expression (1.23) allows us to solve for the optimal level of material input use(~*) independently 
from hedging, purchases, sales, and beginning inventories. A careful look at (1.22) and (1.20) 
reveals that optimal output sales (P/) are independent not only from the amounts hedged but also 
from use, purchases, and beginning stocks of material input Output sales can take any value that 
does not exceed beginning stocks of fmal good. If sales equal beginning stocks, then P r" = ~; if 
sales are strictly less than beginning stocks then llr = 0, and the precise level of sales is obtained 
from (1.22). Similarly, expressions (1.24) and (1.21) allow us to solve for the optimal level of 
material input purchases (Sn independently from sales and beginning stocks of fmal good. 
4We will assume for the remainder of the analysis that the solution to (1.6) exists. The conditions for 
existence are given in Dimitri Bertsekas (1976, p. 375). 
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In summary, the existence of forward markets for final good and material input leads to 
separation of purchases/processing/sales and speculative decisions for the forward-looking risk-
averse firm. Moreover, optimal purchases, processing, and sales are independent of the agent's 
degree of risk aversion and the distributions of random cash prices. Sales of final good are 
obviously independent of the level of risk aversion and the random prices so long as sales equal 
beginning inventories (i.e., Pt" = ~). Alternatively, if sales of final good are less than beginning 
inventories (i.e., P/ < ~). then the terms in which the risk attitude and the random prices appear 
collapse to zero, and again sales are independent of these variables. A similar analysis can be 
applied to show that purchases of material input are also independent of the decision maker's 
degree of risk aversion and the distribution of cash prices. 
For interior solutions, the comparative statics corresponding to output sales, and purchases 
and use of material input can be obtained by setting the right-hand side terms in (1.22) through 
( 1.24) equal to zero and totally differentiating the resulting expressions. This derivation is 
straightforward after recalling the properties imposed on the nonmaterial and storage cost functions 
(c(-), i(·), and i'(·), respectively). Comparative statics are summarized in Table I. 
The theoretical results reported in Table 1 indicate that the optimal use of material input 
should be negatively related to its current cash price and positively related to the forward price of 
final good. Beginning stocks of final good may or may not affect material input use, depending on 
the particular form of the nonmaterial variable cost function. Under some conditions, it can be 
shown that material input use adjusts negatively to increases in beginning stocks of final good. 5 
The impact of the interest rate on material input use is negative if use is independent of output 
beginning stocks, and it is ambiguous otherwise. Purchases of material input respond in the same 
fashion as material input use but are also positively related to the current forward price of material 
input and negatively related to the beginning stock of material input Sales of final good are 
independent of cash and forward prices of material input as well as beginning inventories of 
5This response to beginning inventories of final good is obtained by letting c = c(Q,, !J, c1 > 0, c, > 0, c11 
> 0, C,2 > 0, C12 = 0. 
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material input. Output sales are positively related to current output cash price and beginning 
inventories of final good, and they are negatively associated to current output forward price. The 
interest rate has a positive effect on sales if input use does not depend on output beginning stocks, 
and an ambiguous effect otherwise. 
The existence and direction of the causal relationships summarized in Table 1 are very 
different from those predicted by the standard myopic model. Processing, purchases, and sales are 
either identical or bear fixed relationships in the myopic model. It is interesting therefore to 
investigate whether the hypothesized relationships of Table 1 are supported by an appropriate data 
set. This investigation is the purpose of the remainder of the paper. 
II. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The U.S. soybean-processing industry was chosen to test the theoretical propositions 
because there are highly liquid futures markets for both material input (soybeans) and final goods 
(soybean oil and meal) in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBon. In addition, there are available 
high-quality data at a monthly frequency, which is the observation horizon employed in the 
empirical application. 6 
Before turning to the description of the methodology, data, and estimation procedures, it is 
worthwhile to summarize the empirical results from the econometric model in terms comparable to 
Table I. This inversion of the standard presentation procedure allows a more direct linkage of 
theory and practice and is justified in part by the necessary complexity of the application of the 
model. Table 2 is entirely analogous to Table 1, but it contains the estimated partial elasticities 
corresponding to the U.S. soybean-processing industry.7 A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals 
that use and purchases of material input, as well as final good sales generally follow the 
6Roben Menon (1982, p. 656) defines observation horizon as "the length of time between successive 
observations of the data by the researcher." 
7 Soybean processors produce meal and oil in fixed proportions. and so there are two relevant output prices. 
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hypothesized pattern. The only exception is that beginning output stocks have a nonsignificant 
effect on material input purchases. Fututes price of soybeans is significantly different from zero at 
the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent level; this lack of significance at the 1 percent level, 
however, is due to multicollinearity (this point is discussed in more detail in the next section). 
The most important featute of these results is that decisions regarding input use, input 
purchases, and output sales can be treated separately and in a predictable way when modeling the 
short-run behavior in these industries. In results presented later, it is shown that all but one of the 
relationships left blank in Table 2 are nonsignificant In the absence of the preceding theoretical 
analysis, the lack of significance of these missing variables might seem counterintuitive. For 
example, one might (as the USDA does) use cash prices of oil and meal relative to the cash price of 
soybeans as a measure of processing profitability (USDA, Economic and Statistics Service, Fats 
and Oils--Outlook and Situation). A priori, any of the dependent variables could be used as a 
measure of the activity of the finn, and any one or set of the explanatory variables as the incentives 
to which the fum responds. 
To emphasize the differences in relative magnitudes among input use, input purchases, and 
output sales, the short-term total elasticities of these variables with respect to prices and beginning 
inventories are summarized in Table 3. Table 3 differs from Table 2 in that it includes the indirect 
effect of prices and beginning inventories through the impact of input use (production) on input 
purchases (output sales).& The magnitudes of the total elasticities are directly comparable across 
the dependent variables and show, for example, that the soybean cash price causes a much greater 
change in soybean purchases than in soybean use. These elasticities indicate that the soybean cash 
price is the single most important factor affecting processors' behavior. Table 3 also indicates that 
in the short term processors adjust to changes in cash and fututes prices mainly through their 
soybean purchases (a result consistent with the relative volatility of crushings, purchases, and sales 
depicted in Figure 2). 
8The rationale for having crushings (production) as an explanatory variable in the regression for purchases 
(sales) is discussed in the next section. 
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The monthly total elasticities of purchases and sales with respect to own cash prices are 
larger in absolute value than the analogous elasticities with respect to futures. For soybean 
purchases, this result happens because soybean cash prices affect the profitability of both storage 
and crushings, whereas soybean futures influence only the returns to soybean storage. The 
explanation for oil and meal sales is that futures have not only a direct impact on sales but also an 
opposite indirect effect through production. The indirect effect partially offsets the direct impact 
for oil (so that total response to own futures price is negative), but the former outweighs the latter 
for meal (leading to a positive total effect). 
The largest (in absolute value) monthly total elasticity with respect to beginning inventories 
is that of soybean purchases with respect to soybean beginning stocks, which equals -0.33. The 
other elasticities with respect to beginning stocks are very small in absolute value, ranging from 
-0.05 to 0.0 14. 
Long-term equilibrium elasticities are reported in Table 4.9 According to these elasticities, 
the major long-term adjustment mechanism for processors are stocks rather than crushings (which 
in long-term equilibrium are identical to purchases and (weighted) sales). This difference in 
adjustment patterns is even larger when one examines long-term responses to futures prices. The 
long-term elasticity of crushings with respect to futures is small (0.16 for oil futures and 0.42 for 
meal futures), whereas the long-term elasticity of crushings with respect to cash prices ranges 
between 0.23 (oil and meal cash prices) and -1.03 (soybean cash prices). This finding may help 
explain why econometric models that use observation horizons longer than one month include cash 
prices but not futures in the set of variables explaining amounts processed. The main long-term 
impact of futures is on stocks, which are the endogenous variables with the worst fit in most 
econometric models. 
The results presented above indicate that cash prices are important to explain crushings, not 
because firms ignore futures markets (as is implicitly or explicitly assumed in the standard 
~ote that we talk of long term and not of long run, because throughout the analysis crushing capacity is 
considered an exogenous variable. 
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literature) but because in the long term futures markets mainly influence inventory levels. Models 
that use cash prices when futures quotes are available may be correct in a reduced-form sense, but 
these models will inevitably do a poor job of explaining inventory levels. If one assumes that 
firms ignore futures prices in output decisions, then it is difficult to motivate the use of futures 
prices in inventory decisions. 
III. Estimation and Derivation of the Empirical Results 
Ideally, the empirical estimation of the theoretical model should be conducted with data 
corresponding to a single firm, with an observation horizon coincidental with the planning horizon, 
and using that fum's forward prices. Existing data, however, precludes us from using such an 
ideal data set because series on physical decisions are available only in aggregate and because 
forward prices are not available. 
Employing futures instead of forward prices in this application can be supported, both 
theoretically and empirically. The main theoretical results concerning the hypotheses to be tested 
hold (under some restrictions) in the presence of futures markets (see Section I). Futures are 
widely used by soybean processors for hedging purposes. Also, given the aggregate nature of 
data on physical quantities, futures prices are preferable to forward prices, as forward prices would 
be plant-specific. Furthermore, our sense is that for the U.S. soybean processing industry there is 
no substantial difference between futures and forward contracts in terms of their relative impact on 
the cash flow of the fmns. First, only margins are required to operate in futures markets. Second, 
margins are usually held in the form of Treasury bills and/or other interest-bearing securities. 
Third, margins are relatively small for soybean processors because these firms are classified as 
hedgers. Finally, margin calls are made on net positions only. 
The behavioral hypotheses derived in Section I are applicable in the context of the firm's 
decision horizon. For soybean processors, the decision horizon may be roughly estimated as one 
week (Dah-Nein Tzang and Raymond Leuthold 1990). The observation horizon employed in the 
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empirical analysis, however, is one month because data on receipts, crushings, and shipments are 
not available covering periods shorter than one month. Data aggregated over periods longer than 
one month are purposely avoided because the dynarrilcs of the firm's decisions becomes more 
difficult to analyze as the observation horizon lengthens. Averages of cash and futures prices tend 
to converge to each other as the observation horizon lengthens, and the same is true of purchases, 
crushings, and (weighted) sales. The underlying hypothesis is that this convergence hides much 
useful information on firm behavior (see Figures I and 2). 
When the observation horizon is not the same as the decision horizon (i.e., the case of most 
empirical studies), there are problems that have to date been largely ignored in the literature. In this 
particular application, for example, production (Q,) and material input use (Qi) must be included 
as explanatory variables in the regressions for output sales (P1) and material input purchases (S,), 
respectively, because the observation horizon exceeds the decision horizon.IO But because 
production and material input use are endogenous variables, ordinary least squares yield 
inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters in the regressions for s, and P, (William Greene 
1990, p. 592). Consequently, the behavioral equations must be estimated by means of a 
simultaneous-equations model. 
In this application, monthly rather than quarterly or annual data are employed because they 
provide a closer match between decision and observation horizons. But estimating high-frequency 
IOpor simplicity, assume that optimal production and sales levels at date tare Q,• and zero, respectively. 
Let all exogenous variables stay unchanged for the remaining 1: decision dates comprised in the observation horizon 
0. It follows from expression (123) that optimal production for all decision dates t+1 through t+'t will remain 
unchanged, so that production over the observation horizon will be Q0 = (1:+1) Q,·. According to expression (122), 
optimal sales at decision dates t+ 1 through t+'t will be identical to the changes in beginning stocks, which are equal 
to optimal production at the previous decision date (i.e., P,' = 0, and P,.1• = P,.2• = ... = P,.,• = Q,'). Hence, sales 
over the observation horizon are Po= 1: Q,• = 1:/(1:+ 1) Q0 , implying that observed sales asymptotically approach 
observed production as the observation horizon lengthens with respect to the decision horizon (i.e., P0 --> Q0 as 1: 
--> ~J. Because of this resul~ the sales regression must include production as an explanatory variable if 1: > 0, even 
though production is also an endogenous variable. Note also that the effect is from production on sales and not the 
other way around. so that sales ought not be included as an explanatory variable in the production regression. 
The same reasoning can be applied to motivate the inclusion of processing as an explanatory variable in the 
regression for material input purchases. 
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(e.g., monthly) models introduces dynamic complexities because such models are more likely to 
present nonstationary variables, autocorrelated errors and/or dependent variables, 
heteroscedasticity, and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. For this reason, tests to 
detect nonstationarity are performed before proceeding to the estimation of the model. The 
possibility of autocorrelated errors and/or dependent variables is explicitly dealt with by allowing 
autocorrelation structure in the errors and by allowing lags of the dependent variable to enter as 
additional explanatory variables. Heteroscedasticity is explicitly dealt with in a similar manner. 
Prices always appear as margins in expressions (1.22) through (1.24): (f~t+l - r, p,), 
(f~t+/<l> - r, s,). and (~t+l - r, s,). In the empirical estimation, these restrictions on prices are 
directly imposed to avoid multicollinearity, but using price ratios instead of price differences: 
ft.t+/(r, p,), (f,,t+/<1>)/(r, s,), and f,;t+/(r, s,). Ratios are used for three main reasons. First, they 
are easy to interpret: the ratios are simply discounted end-of-period rates of return per unit of input. 
The ratios are positive and around unity, with large (small) values suggesting profits (losses). 
Second, the ratio specification eliminates the need for a price index to express the price series in 
real terms because cash prices are obvious deflators. II Third, the problem of not having delivery 
positions for all months in the futures market is easier to overcome, as discussed below. 
The delivery months for soybean oil and meal in the CBOT are January, March, May, July, 
August, September, October, and December. Hence, in many months f~t+k (k > 1) must be 
employed instead off~t+l because f~t+l does not exist.12 But using f~t+k implies that the price 
ratios for months with different k are not comparable. For example, the ratio (f~r+J!<l>)/s,, which 
involves a rate of return over k > 1 months, cannot be compared with the ratio (f"+/<1>)/s,, which 
involves a one-month rate of return only. This lack of comparability among ratios for different 
months suggests converting them to the same base; and to facilitate the interpretation of the results, 
an annual base is chosen. Then, the corresponding annualized end-of-period rates of return are 
[(f~t+J!<l>)/s,] 12ik, where k is the number of months between the placement of the hedge and the 
II For example, soybeans have accounted for more than 90 percent of the cost of producing oil and meal. 
12Examples of nonexistent ft,t+l are fJ..,,Feb• fMat.Apt• fM•y)un• and foct.N"· 
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delivery month. This procedure is important because in practice the positions most used for 
hedging not always are the nearest ones. For example. in February most hedges are placed against 
the May position instead of the March position; therefore, the relevant futures price for our 
purposes is not fFeb.Mar but fFeb.May· 
Soybean processing involves one material input and not one but two outputs in fixed 
proportions: oil and meal. Hence, the ratio [(f1•1+J<P)/s1] 121k must be modified to make it suitable 
to analyze the soybean complex. The ratio employed is [((t+J<P0 + r,:',+J<Pm)/s1] 121k, where the 
superscripts o and m stand for oil and meal, respectively. This expression should be interpreted in 
the same way as for the single-output case, with the difference that its numerator consists of a 
composite index of two futures prices of final goods, each one weighted by its corresponding 
production share. 
To account for seasonal factors, such as the difference in length among months and the 
plant closing for maintenance that takes place toward the end of the commercial year, monthly 
dummy variables are allowed in the regressions. Finally, the industry crushing capacity (CAP,) is 
also included as an explanatory variable in the regression for crushings. Crushing capacity is 
expected to be positively related to crushings because it limits the amount of soybeans that firms 
are able to process, and it also captures a time trend. 
From the preceding discussion, the basic equations to be estimated for the soybean 
complex are 
Crushings 
ns 12 
+ ~ss ln(I~) + ~6s ln(Q~) + L A.is ln(S1_i) + L 8is MONTIIit + u5t 1=1 t=2 Purchases 
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(3.3) ln(P~) = ~Oo + ~lo ln(RETURN;'l + ~20 In(~) + ~30 In(~) 
no 12 
+ I A. ln(P~ ) + I o MONTHit + uot i=l 10 -1 i=2 10 Oil Sales 
(3 .4) ln(P,") = ~Om + ~lm ln(RETURN~) + ~Zm In (I~) + ~Jm ln(Q~) 
Meal Sales 
where In(·) is the natural logarithm operator, u denotes error terms, and~. A., and o are constants. 
The variables RE~, RETURN:, RETURN;' and RETURN~ are rates of return per unit of 
input corresponding to crushings, soybeans, oil, and meal, respectively.J3 The coefficients 
associated with the RETURN variables are expected to be significantly greater than zero in the 
soybean crushings and purchases equations, and significantly less than zero in the oil and meal 
sales equations. The variable MONTHit is a dummy variable that equals I in month i, and equals 
zero otherwise.J4 As stated earlier, the u errors are allowed to be autocorrelated and 
heteroscedastic: 15 
13The expressions for the RETURN variables are 
where k = 2 if t =January, March, May, June, October, and November, k = 3 if t =February, April, September, and 
December; k = 4 if t =August; and k = 5 if t =July. h = 2 ift =January, March, May,June, September, and 
November; h = 3 if t =February, April, August, and October; and h = 4 if t =July. Data on open interest reveal 
that, on average, these are the most used combinations of hedge· placement/delivery months. 
14For example, MONTH2, equals I for February observations, and equals 0 for non-February observations. 
15 An exponential function is employed to model heteroscedasticity because it precludes negative variances. 
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where p denotes constants, B is the lag operator (i.e., B ujr = uj,.1), expO is the exponential 
operator, Qi' is a vector of constants, and £jr is a vector of variables explaining heteroscedasticity. 
The error vector Y, = (v0,, v5,, v0 ,, vm,)' is assumed to be independently multinormally distributed 
with zero mean vector and covariance matrix ~-
The data cover September 1965 through December 1986. The period analyzed ends in 
1986 because in the mid-!980s the processing sector suffered a profound concentration, raising 
doubts regarding its competitive performance (see Jean-Pierre Bertrand 1988, and Bruce Marion 
and Donghwan Kim 1991). All prices and quantities for the soybean complex are expressed in 
dollars per short ton and millions of short tons, respectively. Cash prices are quotations FOB 
Decatur published by the USDA, and data on crushings, receipts, and shipments are those reported 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.16 Data sources for crushing capacity are USDA's Fats and 
Oils--Outlook and Situation for 1965 through 1980, and the American Soybean Association's Soya 
Blue Book for 1981 through 1986. These sources only report crushing capacity at the beginning 
of October, hence capacity for the remaining months is approximated by linear interpolation. 
Interest rate is the prime rate reported by the USDC's Survey of Current Business. Finally, 
futures prices are the monthly averages of daily closing futures prices for the selected delivery 
positions from the Statistical Annual of the CBOT .11 
The results of the Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots are presented in Table 5. These tests 
lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root in all of the series of dependent variables and 
in six out of the eight series of explanatory variables at the I percent level of significance.!& All 
16Available data correspond to receipts and shipments instead of actual purchases and sales, so that it is 
assumed that receipts and shipments are identical to purchases and sales. respectively. 
17 All data are avaliable from the authors upon request 
18For completeness, the results of the Phillips-Perron tests are reported for all series employed. But the 
presence of nonstationarity is relevant only in the series of dependent variables, as the only plausible theoretical 
result of regressing a stationary variable on a nonstationary variable is that the coefficient associated with the latter 
equals zero (C. Granger 1986, p. 216). 
21 
four explanatory variables and the logarithms of oil and meal production are stationary with a 
deterministic time trend, whereas the logarithms of RETURNs and of soybean and meal beginning 
stocks are stationary without a trend. The Phillips-Perron tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root for the logarithms of oil beginning stocks and of crushing capacity. Because of the low 
power of the Phillips-Perron tests, however, nonrejection of the null hypothesis does not provide 
strong evidence that a series has a unit root. This assertion is supported by the results of the test 
recently developed by Denis Kwiatkowski eta!. (1992), in which the null hypothesis is 
stationarity. The values of this test are 0.037 and 0.061 (0.136 and 0.215) for the logarithms of 
oil beginning stocks and crushing capacity with (without) a deterministic trend; the critical value at 
the 5 percent level of significance equals 0.146 (0.463) for the series with (without) a deterministic 
time trend. 
The first step in estimating the model is to calculate the fixed input-output coefficients <l>0 
and <l>m. The monthly data on crushings and oil and meal production yield an average of 5.537 for 
<l>0 and of 1.263 for <l>m. The coefficients of variation of the sample estimates of <l>0 and <l>m are 
only 2.35 percent and 0.85 percent, respectively, lending strong support to the assumption that 
soybean processing is characterized by a Leontief production function. 
Given the results of the nonstationarity tests, and using <l>0 = 5.537 and <l>m = 1.263, the 
behavioral regressions (3.1) through (3.4) (and the corresponding error structure (3.5)) are 
estimated as a simultaneous-equations model, subject to the accounting identities 
(3.6) .r; = .r;_1 + St-1 - 0:-1 Soybean Inventories 
(3.7) I~= ( 1 -~-I + Q,~ 1 Oil Inventories 
(3.8) I~=!,"\ - ~~ + Q~1 Meal Inventories 
and the fixed input-output restrictions 
22 
(3.9) Q.0 = 0:fc1>0 Oil Production 
Meal Production 
The estimation procedure employed is full information maximum likelihood.J9 The estimation 
results of the selected model are contained in Tables 6 through 8. The basic criteria employed for 
model selection are the properties of the v errors and the principle of parsimony. 
Tests on the selected model's v errors are presented first (see Table 6) because the 
properties of these errors are key for model selection. Table 6 summarizes the results of the 
Lagrange multiplier test for normality, the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for autocorrelation, the 
Lagrange multiplier test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, and the White and 
Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity. According to this collection of tests, there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses of normality, serial independence, and 
homoscedasticity in the selected model's v errors. 
The estimated structural equations (i.e., the estimates of (3.1) through (3.4)) are reported in 
Table 7. The system's goodness-of-fit statistic is~= 0.997, and the R2s for the individual 
equations range from 0.946 to 0.99].20 In the selected model, the coefficients associated with the 
monthly dummy variables in the oil and meal sales equations are constrained to equal zero. This 
restriction is imposed for parsimony and reduces the number of estimated parameters from 77 to 
55. In the unrestricted model, none of the 22 omitted dummy variables is individually significant 
I "Maximum likelihood is chosen over instrumental variables and feasible generalized least squares because 
instrumental variable estimators are biased in finite samples and have variances that are not easy to establish (John 
Johnston 1984, p. 363 and 365), and feasible generalized least squares preclude the usage of likelihood ratio tests and 
Lagrange multiplier tests (William Greene 1990, p. 392). 
20nJe statistic ~is the pseudo R2 introduced by Nevins Baxter and John Cragg (1970). This statistic is 
defmed as~= I - exp[2 (L.,- Ln)/N], where L,. is the maximum of the log likelihood function when only 
intercepts are used, L0 is the maximum of the log likelihood function when all coefficients are included in the 
model, and N is the number of observations. The R2 for each individual equation is the squared correlation between 
predicted and acrual dependent variables (G. S. Maddala 1988, p. 307). 
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at the I percent level and only one is significant at the 5 percent level. In addition, the likelihood 
ratio test indicates that the null hypothesis that all 22 monthly coefficients in the sales equations 
equal zero cannot be rejected. For similar reasons, the equations for crushings, purchases, and oil 
sales contain only a single lag in the dependent variable, and the meal sales equation contains no 
lags. Alternative specifications (e.g., with monthly dummies in all equations, without monthly 
dummies in any equation, and with different lags) yield no major changes in the signs or 
magnitudes of the structural parameters. 
Production is a highly significant explanatory variable of sales, and crushings is a highly 
significant explanatory variable of purchases. The estimated elasticities of sales (purchases) with 
respect to production (crushings) are consistent with the discrepancy between decision and 
observation horizons (the meal sales elasticity, however, seems relatively Iarge).21 
Crushing capacity is a highly significant explanatory variable of the amount of soybeans 
processed. The short-run elasticity of crushings with respect to capacity is 0.245. Although this 
value is apparently small, it yields a long-term equilibrium elasticity of crushings with respect to 
capacity equal to 0.87.22 
As hypothesized, beginning inventories of final goods have a significantly positive impact 
on their respective sales, and beginning stocks of soybeans have a significantly negative effect on 
material input purchases. In general, however, the corresponding total monthly elasticities are 
small in absolute value: 0.03 for meal sales, 0.14 for oil sales, and -0.33 for soybean purchases 
(see Table 3).23 The empirical findings indicate that the elasticity of crushings with respect to 
beginning inventories of oil and meal is significantly negative (albeit very small in absolute value), 
ruling out separation between production and output storage in the U.S. soybean-processing 
industry. 
21 With a decision horizon of one week and an observation horizon of one month, t ; 3 and therefore 
t/(t+l); 0.75 (see footnote II). 
22The methodology to obtain long-tenn elasticities from the structural parameters reported in Table 7 is 
explained in Appendix B. 
23Note that the total monthly elasticities of oil and meal sales with respect to own beginning stocks 
include the indirect effect of beginning stocks on oil and meal production. 
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One of the most important empirical results regarding the theoretical model is that the 
RETURN variables have the expected effects and are significant. The likelihood ratio test for the 
null hypothesis that all five RETURN coefficients equal zero is 78.06, which strongly indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis (the critical value at the I percent level of significance is x;,o.oi = 
15.09). The t statistics of the RE11JRN coefficients in the crushings and purchases equations 
indicate that, individually, the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level 
but not at the 1 percent level. This result, however, is misleading; the likelihood ratio test for the 
null hypothesis that these three coefficients are all zero equals 43.92, which is considerably larger 
than the 1 percent critical value of X~;O.OI = 11.34. In addition, the likelihood ratio test for the null 
hypothesis that theRE~ coefficient equals zero in the crushings (purchases) equation is 7.92 
(10.44), which is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level (the I percent critical value 
is xi.o 01 = 6.64). In the case of the purchases equation, the problem is attributable to 
multicollinearity caused by high correlation between RETURN; and RETURN;'. Evidence of this 
assertion is that deleting RETURN; from the purchases equation yields a RETURN;' coefficient 
equal to 0.429 with a likelihood ratio test of 35.58; deleting instead RE~ from the same 
equation, the coefficient for RETURN; becomes 0.411 with a likelihood ratio test of 31.58. 
The variables labeled as ad hoc in Table 7 are those that could be included in an adl!QC 
model of the industry, but which are not predicted by the theoretical model. An unrestricted model 
including all these variables reveals that, individually, only one of the associated 16 coefficients is 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test for the 
null hypothesis that the 15 nonsignificant coefficients are all equal to zero is 15.74, yielding no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis (the critical value at the 5 percent level equals x~5;0.05 = 
25.00). The only significant ad hoc variable is RETURN: in the meal sales equation; a possible 
rationale for this significance is that meal and soybeans compete for storage space. Interestingly, if 
one begins by searching the data for variables that are significant, one would with three exceptions 
(oil and meal stocks do not significantly influence soybean purchases, and RETURN; significantly 
affects meal sales) arrive at the model structure predicted by the theory. 
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Table 8 shows the model's u errors structure (i.e., expression (3.5)). The selected 
structure is the result of preliminary analysis based on the properties of the v errors and parsimony. 
On this basis, most autocorrelation coefficients in the selected model are set to zero. Similarly, the 
heteroscedasticity structure is relatively simple. Again, it is reassuring that the magnitudes of the 
structural coefficients are largely unaffected when the autocorrelation coefficients are not 
constrained and when the heteroscedasticity coefficients are restricted to equal zero. 
IV. Conclusions 
The paper provides theoretical evidence that in the short run purchases and processing of 
material input and production and sales of fmal goods by typical manufacturing firms should, and 
do, respond to explanatory variables in different ways than is commonly accepted. These results 
are achieved by introducing the realistic assumption that firms make production, purchasing, and 
selling decisions in order to take advantage of cash and forward price differentials, while hedging 
the inherent risk in forward markets. Although the focus of the study is on short-run behavior, the 
results show that inferences made about long-term behavior derived by aggregating over short-term 
decisions are different in some respects from the inferences one would draw from medium- or 
long-run models. 
For the particular industry analyzed, U.S. soybean processing, it is found that the long-
term equilibrium elasticity of crushings with respect to price is close to unity. This estimate is 
distinctly larger than the standard elasticity estimates obtained in studies which use aggregate 
annual data. It is also found that U.S. soybean processors exhibit a very elastic long-term 
equilibrium response of stocks to prices, and in particular to futures prices. This fmding is also in 
sharp contrast with the findings of models based on aggregate annual data. These results may help 
explain why the stock regressions in annual models generally exhibit poor fit: annual models 
largely ignore the role of futures (or forward) prices on processors' behavior. 
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The model presented is capable of identifying the individual effect of each cash and forward 
price on purchases, processing, and sales. The cash price of material input (soybeans) appears to 
be the single most important price affecting processors' decisions. Cash prices of output (i.e., oil 
and meal cash prices) do not affect material input use (i.e., soybean crushings) in the short term, 
but they do affect use in long-term equilibrium. Output futures prices, in contrast, affect crushings 
both in the short term and in long-term equilibrium. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of Expressions (1.15), (1.16), and (1.17) 
The FOCs corresponding to dates t = 0, ... , T-1 are (AI) through (A3) plus (1.18) through 
(1.21). 
(AI) t+ 1 •r r a1 J aP, + r, ... rT_ 1 (p, + 1) M, -11, = 0 
(A2) t+l - 1 - .S, 1- S < a I' ] a~ r, ... rT_ 1 (c/<1> 1) M, 11, _ 0, 
a£ 
n' ;::: 0, Q' -' = 0 
'<t t a~ 
a£ {aM (A3) -' = E -"~_+_1 
as, a~+ 1 
a I' ] t+ 1 .S, 1 S as, -r, ... rT_ 1 (s, + 1 ) M, + 11, = 0 
But note that 
(A4) a I,+ 1 - =-1 
aP, 
(A5) ait+1 -=1 
a I, 
(A6) ait+1 --=I 
aQ, 
(A7) a:r:+ 1 
-- =1 
as, 
(AS) a:r:+ 1 -=1 
a~ 
(A9) a:r:+ 1 -=-1 
a~ 
(A 10) CJQt = 1/<l> 
aq 
Also, 
(All') 
(Al2) 
(Al2') 
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where expressions (All') and (Al2') are obtained by using expressions (Al), (A3), (A4), (A5), 
(A 7), and (A8). It follows from (All') and (Al2') that 
(Al4) 
By substituting (A4) through (AJO) and (Al3) through (Al4) into FOCs (Al) through (A3), and 
by rearranging a little, we get expressions (1.15) through (1.17). 
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Appendix B. Derivation of Long-Term Equilibrium Elasticities 
In long-term equilibriwn, beginning stocks must remain unchanged from date to date. 
Hence, 
Is= Is = Is 
t t-1 
Io-Ta -Io t - 't-1 -
(Bl) S=Q' 
(B2) po = Qo = Q'!c!>o 
=> 
where time subscripts are dropped when referring to long-term equilibriwn values. 
From the regression for oil sales we have 
(B4) ln(P0 ) = a 1 - 0.088 ln(RETURN°) + 0.163ln(l") + 0.742ln(Q0 )- 0.!32ln(P0 ) 
where ai (i = 1, 2, ... , 6) represents terms in the regression that are irrelevant for our purposes. 
Substituting (B2) into (B4) and solving for ln(l0 ) in terms of ln(Q5) yields 
(B5) ln(I0 ) = a2 + 0.541 ln(RETURN") + 2.388 ln(Q') 
By performing analogous operations for meal sales and soybean purchases we get 
(B6) ln(Im) = ~ + 0.343 ln(RETU~) + 0.869 ln(QJ 
(B7) ln(I') = a4 + 0.860 ln(RETURNc) + 0.682 ln(RETURN') + 0.288 ln(Q
5
) 
+ o.o87 ~net) -o.o63 ~ncr) 
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Finally, by replacing (B5) and (B6) into the regression for crushings (B8) 
(B8) ln(QJ = a5 + 0.061ln(RETURN")- 0.0246 ln(I")- 0.0391n(r") + 0.812ln(Q') 
and solving the resulting expression for ln(Q') we obtain 
(B9) ln(Q') = a6 + 0.216ln(RETURNc)- 0.047 ln(RETURN")- 0.0481n(RETURNm) 
Expression (B9) is the basic equation to calculate the long-term equilibrium elasticities for 
crushings. Substitution of (B9) in (B5) through (B7) allows us to obtain the long-term elasticities 
for inventories. The average values used in the calculations were 12/k = 4.787, 12/h = 4.918, 
(~t+J<I>0)/(~t+k"<l>" + r.:'t+k"<l>m) = 0.372, and cr,:'t+k/<l>m)/(~t+k"<l>0 + ~t+k"<l>m) = 0.628. 
Table l. Theoretical Effect of Exogenous Variables on Material Input Use (Production), Material 
Input Purchases, and Output Sales over the Decision Horizon. 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
Mat. Input Use Mat. Input Purchases Output Sales 
Cash prices: input 0 
output 0 0 + 
Forward prices: input 0 + 0 
output + + 
Interest rate -I? -I? +I? 
Beginning stocks: input 0 0 
output 0!- 0!- + 
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Table 2. Empirical Estimates of the Average Partial Elasticities of Monthly Material Input Use 
(Production), Material Input Purchases, and Output Sales of U.S. Soybean Processors 
with Respect to Selected Explanatory Variables, 1965:9-1986:12. 
Explanatory Variable 
Cash prices: soybeans 
oil 
meal 
Futures prices: soybeans 
oil 
meal 
Interest rate 
Beginning stocks: soybeans 
oil 
meal 
Mat Input 
Use 
-0.29** 
0.11** 
0.18** 
-0.005•• 
-0.025•• 
-0.039** 
Dependent Variable 
Mat Input 
Purchases 
-2.50•• 
1.12* 
0.51** 
0.86** 
-0.04•• 
-0.334•• 
0.029 
-0.021 
Output Sales 
Oil 
0.42** 
-0.42** 
0.008•• 
0.163•• 
Meal 
0.11** 
-0.11** 
0.002** 
0.069•• 
Note: The partial elasticities contained in this table were obtained from the coefficients reponed in Table 7. 
by taking an average of 12/k = 4.787, 12/h = 4.918, r, = 1.095, (t:;,.kl<l>0 )/(f.;,.J<I>o + r::,.J<!>'") = 0.372, and 
(J\:',.J<I>'")/(t:;,.J<%>0 + f.:,.J<!>'") = 0.628. For example, the panial elasticity of soybean purchases with respect to oil 
futures price was calculated as (0.372 x 4.787 x 0.29) = 0.51. 
• (**)Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level on the basis of the likelihood ratio test 
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Table 3. Monthly Total Elasticities of Crushings, Purchases, and Sales with Respect to Prices and 
Beginning Stocks. 
Explanatory Variable 
Cash prices: soybeans 
oil 
meal 
Futures prices: soybeans 
oil 
meal 
Beginning stocks: soybeans 
oil 
meal 
Mat Input 
Use 
-0.29 
0.11 
0.18 
-0.02 
-0.04 
Dependent Variable 
Mat Input 
Purchases 
Output Sales 
-2.71 
1.12 
0.59 
1.00 
-0.33 
0.01 
-0.05 
Oil 
-0.22 
0.42 
-0.34 
0.14 
0.14 
-0.03 
Meal 
-0.27 
0.11 
0.10 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.03 
Note: The total elasticities contained in this table were obtained from the coefficients reported in Table 7, 
by taking an average of 12/k = 4.7fl;J, 12/h = 4.918, ((;,.kf<l>')/(f.:,.J<l>' + r;;,.,J<f>'") = 0.372, and 
(~,.J<f>'")/(fi:,.kf<l>' + r;;,.J<f>'") = 0.628. For example, the total elasticity of oil sales with respect to soybean cash 
price was calculated as[(-!) x 0.061 x4.787 x 0.742] = -0.22. 
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Table 4. Long-Term Equilibrium Elasticities of Crushings and Stocks with Respect to Cash and 
Futures Prices. 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
Crushings (Sales, Soybean Oil Meal 
and Purchases) Stocks Stocks Stocks 
Cash prices: soybeans -!.03 -7.92 -2.47 -0.90 
oil 0.23 -0.13 -2.05 0.20 
meal 0.23 0.20 0.54 -1.45 
Futures prices: soybeans 3.35 
oil 0.16 !.83 2.97 0.14 
meal 0.42 2.67 !.01 2.01 
Note: The derivation of the elasticities reported in this table is explained in Appendix B. 
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Table 5. Phillips-Ferron Tests for Unit Roots. a 
Alternative Hypothesis: l. Y, = [1 + ay,_1 + u, 
ll. Y, = ji + j3 t + a Y,. 1 + u, 
Test Statistic zca) Z(ta) Z(t/3) zc&) Z(ta) 
Null HyPothesis a=I a= I "/3=0 a= I a= I 
ln(soybean crushings) -70.4 -6.38 5.36 
ln(soybean purchases) -84.2 -8.72 4.46 
ln(sa!es): oil -166.8 -9.76 8.60 
meal -79.9 -6.77 5.76 
ln(RETURN): crushings -91.7 -7.38 0.17 -9!.9 -7.39 
soybeans -9!.1 -7.40 -2.04 -90.5 -7.30 
oil -42.9 -4.91 0.45 -42.4 -4.9! 
meal -6!.8 -5.98 !.78 -53.1 -5.66 
ln(beg. stocks): soybeans -52.6 -6.07 -0.1! -52.9 -6.1! 
. oil -20.1 -3.22 2.11 -10.2 -2.35 
meal -6!.7 -5.7! 3.27 -30.6 -4.12 
ln(production): oil -74.8 -6.55 5.62 
meal -70.1 -6.34 5.32 
In( crushing capacity) 1.4 0.86 -2.36 -2.3 -3.65 
Critical Value: 5% -21.3 -3.43 2.79 -14.0 -2.88 
1% -28.4 -3.99 3.49 -20.3 -3.46 
Note: The test statistics are calculated using the Bartlett window w,1 = 1- s/(1+1) suggested by Peter Phillips 
and Pierre Perron (1988). Following the analysis of G. William Schwen (1989), the value of the lag truncation 
parameter I is set to I= integer[12 (number of observations/100)114] = 15. 
a see Peter Phillips and Pierre Perron ( 1988). 
40 
Table 6. Tests for Normality, Autocorrelation, Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH), and Heteroscedasticity of v Errors. 
Test for v Error of Equation for Evaluation Statistic p Value 
Normality Crushings LMN= 1.72 0.42 
Purchases LMN =2.82 0.24 
011 Sales LMN = 1.65 0.44 
Meal Sales LMN = 3.54 0.17 
A utocorre1ation Crushings Q'(l) = 1.04 0.31 
Q'(3) = 1.89 0.60 
Q'(12) = 15.3 0.22 
Purchases Q'(l) = 0.23 0.63 
Q'(3) = 1.32 0.72 
Q'(l2) = 8.48 0.75 
011 Sales Q'(l) = 0.56 0.45 
Q'(3) = 3.43 0.33 
Q'(l2) = 11.6 0.48 
Meal Sales Q'(1) = 0.07 0.79 
Q'(3) = 1.10 0.78 
Q'(l2) = 13.5 0.33 
Note: LMN is the Lagrange multiplier test for normality (Carlos Jarque and Ani1 Bera 1980, William 
Greene 1990, p. 329). Q'(i) is the Ljung-Box portmanteau test or modified-Q statistic fori-order autocorrelation (G. 
M. Ljung and G. E. P. Box 1978). LMA is the Lagrange multiplier test for frrst order autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (Robert Engle 1982). W is the White test for heteroscedasticity (Halbert White 1980). LMHi is 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticiry (T. S. Breusch and A. R. Pagan 1979), obtained by 
regressing v,2J(average v,Z) on the jth variable of the set comprising the 14 nondummy explanatory variables of the 
system plus the estimated dependent variable. To save space, only the LMHi with the greatest p value for each v 
error (i.e., max(LMHi )) is reported. 
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Table 6. Continued. 
Test for v Error of Equation for Evaluation Statistic pValue 
ARCH Crushings LMA =0.56 0.45 
Purchases LMA =0.55 0.46 
Oil Sales LMA = 1.95 0.33 
Meal Sales LMA =0.01 0.91 
Heteroscedasticity Crushings W=117.87 0.17 
max(LMHj) = 1.48 0.22 
Purchases w = 128.55 0.80 
max(LMHj) = 1.21 0.27 
Oil Sales w = 13.77 0.84 
max(LMHj) = 2.02 0.16 
Meal Sales W= 8.68 0.85 
max(LMH) = 0.83 0.36 
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Table 7. Estimated System of Structural Equations for U.S. Soybean Processors, 1965:9-
a 1986:12. 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
ln(Soybean 1n(Soybean ln(Oil In (Meal 
Crushings) Purchases) Sales) Sales) 
Intercept -0.216•• 0.24 -0.093 0.127•• 
(-4.11) (1.69) ( -1.58) (7.82) 
ln(RETURN): crushings 0.061* 0.29• ad hoc ad hoc 
(2.33) (2.58) 
soybeans ad hoc 0.23• ad hoc ad hoc 
(2.1 I) 
oil ad hoc ad hoc -0.088•• ad hoc 
(-4.11) 
meal ad hoc ad hoc ad hoc -0.0238•• 
(-2.78) 
ln(beg. stocks): soybeans ad hoc -0.334•• ad hoc ad hoc 
(-5.86) 
oil -0.0246•• 0.029 0.163** ad hoc 
(-2.86) (1.28) (7.45) 
meal -0.039•• -0.021 ad hoc 0.0694•• 
(-3.49) (-<J.63) (7.99) 
ln(crushings) 0.73•• 
(6.63) 
ln(production): oil 0.742•• 
(18.48) 
meal 0.940•• 
(68.79) 
In( crushing capacity) 0.245•• 
(5.04) 
lnOagged dependent variable) 0.812•• 0.370•• -0.132•• 
(19.74) (5.18) (-2.64) 
Note: The tenn ad hoc signifies explanatory variables that could be included in an ad hoc model but which 
are not predicted by the theory presented earlier. These variables were excluded from the system reported here. 
a 
t statistics are shown in parentheses. 
• (**)Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level on the basis of the t-test. 
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Table 7. Continued. 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
ln(Soybean ln(Soybean ln(Oil In (Meal 
Crushings) Purchases) Sales) Sales) 
Dummy: February -0.087•• -0.041 
(-5.23) (-0.64) 
March 0.058•• 0.007 
(3.12) (0.09) 
April -0.049•• -0.156 
(-2.93) (-1.96) 
May 0.036 -0.134 
(1.70) (-1.86) 
June -0.061•• -0.157* 
(-3.57) (-2.14) 
July 0.002 -0.209•• 
(0.09) (-2.77) 
August -0.017 -0.334•• 
(-0.73) (4.24) 
September -0.091** -0.268•• 
(-5.22) (-3.18) 
October 0.164•• 0.35** 
(6.63) (2.91) 
November O.Ql8 0.042 
(1.16) (0.48) 
December 0.032* -0.154• 
2.00 
STATISTICS: 
R2 0.972 0.946 0.974 0.991 
Mean value of dep. variable 0.745 0.668 -0.967 0.512 
Std. error of regression 0.0422 0.127 0.0400 0.0224 
SYSTEM STATISTICS: 
R2=0.997 Log Likelihood Function= -1266.16 Observations = 239 
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Table 8. Structure of u Errors of the Estimated System of Equations for U.S. Soybean 
Processors, 1965:9-1986: 12." 
Structure of u error corresponding to equation for 
ln(Soybean ln(Soybean ln(Oil ln(Meal 
Crushings) Purchases) Sales) Sales) 
Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
PI 0.57** 
(4.71) 
Pz 0.254** 0.199** 
(2.66) (2.76) 
P3 0.474** 
(6.58) 
PI2 0.196** 0.139 
2.68 1.84 
Variables Explaining 
Heteroscedasticity: 
ln[lagged(soybean crushings)] -1.94** 
(-5.32) 
ln( crushing capacity) 1.94** 
(5.32) 
ln[lagged(soybean purchases)] -0.27• 
(-2.11) 
ln(oil beginning stocks) 0.425*• 
(4.81) 
ln(meal beginning stocks) 0.38* 
2.23 
•r statistics are shown in parentheses. 
• (**)Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level on the basis of the t-test. 
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Figure 1. Annual Crushings and Purchases of Soybeans, and Sales of Soybean Oil and Meal, 
U.S. Soybean Processors, 1967/66-1986/85. 
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Figure 2. Monthly Crushings and Purchases of Soybeans, and Sales of Soybean Oil and Meal, 
U.S. Soybean Processors, 1980:8-1982:8. 
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